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Vinson v. Commonwealth
522 S.E.2d 170 (Va. 1999)
L Facts
On May 19, 1996, Angela Felton ("Felton"), accompanied by her
roommate's teenage daughter, Willisa Joyner (Joyner"), drove to the home
that Felton formerly shared with her ex-boyfriend Dexter Lee Vinson
("Vinson") to pick up her mail. Joyner exited the car, but got back in at
Felton's urging once Felon saw Vinson driving up in a blue automobile.
As Felton began driving away, Vinson twice rammed into the back of her
car. Felton stopped the car and Vinson approached the driver's side,
punched out the window, hit Felton in the face and chest, and pulled her
out of the car. After his car would not start, Vinson placed Felton into the
red car she had been driving and drove away.1
Shortly thereafter, Vertley Hunter ("Hunter") was in her home when
she noticed a red car occupied by a white female and a black male parked
behind a vacant house. Over a period of several hours, Hunter watched as
the man choked the woman with a rope, slammed the car door on the
woman's head and "told her that he was going to kill her."2 Hunter also
observed the man kick dirt to cover blood on the ground and wipe blood
off of himself. At trial, Hunter identified Vinson as the man she saw.
Another nearby resident observed a man "messing around" a red car and
saw the man later drag "something heavy" into the vacant house which she
thought may have been a rug.3 She too identified that man as Vinson.4
Felton's nude body was discovered the next day inside a broken wall
within the vacant house. Her body was partially covered with a blanket and
feces was found on her neck area. Although Felton had sustained multiple
injuries, the autopsy revealed that she had bled to death from deep cuts to
both of her forearms. According to the medical examiner, Felton did not
die instantaneously, but rather died after several minutes.'
Vinson was charged with capital murder in the commission of
abduction with the intent to defile6 and convicted after an eight-day jury
1. Vinson v. Commonwealth, 522 S.E.2d 170, 173 (Va. 1999).




6. VA. CODE ANN. S 18.2-31(1) (Michie 1999).
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trial. At sentencing, the jury recommended death based on the vileness and
future dangerousness aggravators. Additionally, Vinson was charged with
and convicted of object sexual penetration, abduction with intent to defile,
and carjacking. He received a life sentence for each offense!
II. Holding
Vinson appealed his death sentence and convictions to the Supreme
Court of Virginia. He alleged that the trial court erroneously: (1) failed to
grant him a DNA expert;8 (2) admitted a statement he made after an illegal
arrest; 9 (3) admitted a mislabeled blood sample; 0 (4) denied his motion to
strike all charges despite the absence of specific intent as well as the reliance
on non-credible eyewitness testimony;" (5) admitted evidence of
unadjudicated criminal conduct; 2 (6) allowed rebuttal testimony regarding
Vinson's future dangerousness, despite the fact that his mitigation expert did
not specifically mention future dangerousness; 3 and (7) prejudiced his trial
by permitting television cameras in the courtroom. 4 Vinson also argued
that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to exclude certain jurors
and admitting others." The Supreme Court of Virginia rejected all of
Vinson's claims and affirmed the trial court.
16
III. Analysis/Application in Virginia7
A. DNA Expert
Vinson argued that the trial court erred in refusing to grant the defense
an independent DNA expert." The victim's DNA was found on a pair of
Vinson's shorts that matched the description of the clothes the perpetra
7. Vinson, 522 S.E.2d at 172-73.
8. Id. at 175.
9. Id. at 176.
10. Id. at 177.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 177-78.
13. Id. at 178.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 176.
16. Id. at 179.
17. Because several of Vinson's claims were summarily dismissed by the court and failed
to raise significant issues, they will not be discussed in detail in this note. First, Vinson
contended that the Virginia capital murder statutes are unconstitutional. Id. at 175. His
argument was dismissed as a matter of routine, since the court held that the constitutionality
of Virginia's death penalty statutes is well settled. Id.
Vinson also claimed that a lack of proper authentication and a defect in the chain of
custody resulted in the improper admission of blood samples. Id. at 177. The samples were
labeled with the wrong date. Id. The court found that the mistake was inconsequential and
[Vol. 12:2
VINSON V COMMONWEALTH
tor was said to be wearing on the day of the murder. 9 Vinson moved for
that chain of custody had been established. Id.
Next, Vinson argued that because he did not have specific intent to molest the victim
when he drove off with her, coupled with the fact that the eyewitness testimony was
"inconsistent* and untrustworthy, the capital murder, abduction with intent to defile, object
sexual penetration, and carjacking charges should have all been stricken. Id. The court
dismissed Vinson's claim and commented that the jury determined the credibility of wit-
nesses. Id. The court also found that the evidence supported the finding that Vinson was
indeed the perpetrator. Id.
Vinson contended that the trial court abused its discretion by seating certain prospec-
tive jurors who expressed pro-death penalty sentiments while excluding others who voiced
anti-death penalty views. Id. at 176. The appellate court will uphold a trial court's decision
to seat or exclude jurors unless there is manifest error. Id. (citing Eaton v. Commonwealth,
397 S.E.2d 385, 391 (Va. 1990)). The Supreme Court of Virginia found that the trial court
properly excluded six jurors who indicated that they could not impose the death penalty. Id.
However, the court upheld the trial judge's decision to seat a juror who expressed that he
.probably would" automatically impose the death penalty should the defendant be found
guilty. Id. In support of its holding, the court stated that impartiality is to be determined
gased on a juror's entire voir dire. Id. The court concluded that because the juror later said
he would obey the court's instructions and also consider life as a sentencing option, it was not
error to seat him. Id.
Vinson objected to the Commonwealth's use of evidence of several unadjudicated acts
attributed to Vinson in order to establish the future dangerousness aggravator during the
sentencing phase. Id. at 175, 178. The trial court dismissed Vinson's contention and stated
that it is well settled by Virginia law that the Commonwealth may use unadjudicated
criminal conduct during sentencing. Id. at 178 (citing Poyner v. Commonwealth, 329 S.E.2d
815, 827-28 (Va. 1985) (holding that admissible evidence is not restricted to the record of
convictions)). The use of unadjudicated criminal conduct at sentencing is a recurring issue
in Virginia death penalty law. For an argument criticizing the use of unadjudicated criminal
conduct unless it has been subjected to a reasonable doubt finding, see Tommy Barrett, A
Modest Proposal Requiring Proof Beyond a Reasonable Doubt for Unadjudicated Acts Offered to
ProveFutureDangerousness, CAP. DEF.J., Spring 1998, at 59, and JasonJ. Solomon, A Quarter
Century ofDeath: A Symposium on Capital Punishment in Virginia since Furman v. Georgia:
Future Dangerousness: Issues and Analysis, 12 CAP. DEF. J. 55, 63-66 (1999) (arguing for
heightened reliability by requiring a standard of proof for unadjudicated criminal acts).
Vinson also alleged that permitting television cameras into the courtroom was prejudi-
cial and amounted to an abuse of the trial court's discretion. Vinson, 522 S.E.2d at 178. The
court flatly rejected Vinson's claim and held that there was no abuse, pointing out that the
decision to allow cameras into the courtroom is in the sole discretion of the trial court. Id.;
see VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-266 (Michie 1995).
Finally, section 17.1-313(C) of the Virginia Code mandates that the Supreme Court of
Virginia review a death sentence to insure that it was neither imposed "under the influence
of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor" nor "excessive or disproportionate" to
sentences imposed under similar circumstances. VA. CODE ANN. S 17.1-313 (Michie 1999).
The Supreme Court of Virginia found that the record supported the determination that
Vinson's sentence was not arbitrary and therefore appropriate under the circumstances.
Vinson, 522 S.E.2d at 178. Likewise, the court held that Vinson's sentence was neither
disproportionate nor excessive. Id. The court noted that Vinson's brutal beating, sexual
assault, abduction, and savage murder of the victim was sufficiently vile to warrant the death
penalty. Id. The court also remarked that juries have elected death for defendants such as
Vinson where the evidence has established the individual's propensity to violence. Id.
18. Vinson, 522 S.E.2d at 178.
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an expert, but informed the trial court that he was having difficulty locating
one.2" The trial court then continued the matter until the next day in order
to allow Vinson time to locate an expert."1 When Vinson still failed to
locate an expert after a day's time, the trial court denied the motion.22 The
Supreme Court of Virginia upheld the trial court's decision and asserted that
"implicit" in the trial court's ruling was the determination that Vinson had
failed to make the required showing of need. 3 The court also found that the
defendant had a sufficient amount of time to search for an expert witness
and that the trial court was not required to conduct its own search.24
The Supreme Court of Virginia's decision raises two concerns. First,
the ruling seems to indicate that the failure to locate an expert witness is the
equivalent to a failure to demonstrate the required showing of need. Under
Husske v. Commonwealth," a defendant seeking a non-psychiatric expert
must demonstrate a particularized need that the proposed expert assistance
is a significant factor in his defense and that he will be prejudiced without
such assistance.26 A defendant meets this burden by showing that expert
assistance is material and that without it, an unfair trial will result.27
Despite having referred to Vinson's motion for expert assistance as
"somewhat vague," it is unclear whether the trial court determined that
Vinson did not or could not have met the required showing of need had he
located an expert in time.2" The Supreme Court of Virginia's conclusion
that Vinson's failure to make the required showing of need was implicit in
the denial of the motion upon his failure to locate a witness seems to have
left undetermined whether Vinson actually established need.
Second, the court's decision appears to place the burden upon the
defendant to proffer a particular expert. Such a requirement for non-psychi-
atric expert assistance contrasts with the statutory requirements for obtain-
ing mental health experts.29 Section 19.2-264.3:1(A) of the Virginia Code
states that the "court shall appoint one or more qualified mental health
19. Id. at 174.
20. Id. at 175.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. (citing Husske v. Commonwealth, 476 S.E.2d 920,925 (Va. 1996) (holding that
an indigent defendant seeking appointment of an expert witness must show that expert
assistance is material to his defense and that lack of such assistance will result in prejudice to
the defendant)).
24. Id. at 175-76.
25. 476 S.E.2d 920 (Va. 1996).
26. Husske, 476 S.E.2d at 925.
27. Id. (citing Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985); State v. Mills, 420 S.E.2d 114, 117
(N.C. 1992); Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 323-34 n.1 (1985)).
28. Vinson, 522 S.E.2d at 175.
29. See VA. CODE ANN. 5 19.2-264.3:1(A) (Michie 1999).
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experts to evaluate the defendant and assist the defense."" Additionally,
under the same section, a defendant is not entitled to a mental health expert
of his own choosing. 1 Yet, in Vinson, the court seems to promulgate a
different standard for non-psychiatric experts by requiring that a defendant
proffer his own expert or forfeit assistance altogether. Obviously, this is a
more onerous requirement than that of section 19.2-264.3:1 inasmuch as the
onus for securing an expert is on the defendant and not the court. With this
in mind, Virginia attorneys should be sure to move for non-psychiatric
expert assistance at the earliest opportunity. Such a motion should meticu-
lously outline why the issue for which assistance is requested is significant
to the preparation of the defense. The motion should also illustrate specifi-
cally how the defendant will be prejudiced in the absence of such assistance.
It is important to detail exactly why expert assistance is material to the case,
as the Supreme Court of Virginia has made it clear that a generalized request
amounting to a "mere suspicion or hope that favorable evidence will be
available" is not sufficient to prevail upon a motion for expert assistance.2
In addition, counsel should have an expert lined up at the time the motion
is filed in order to avoid having the motion denied for failure to proffer an
expert in a timely manner.
B. Suppression of Vinson's Statement
Vinson also contested the admission of a statement he made after being
arrested for what he claimed was "no reason."" The day after the offenses
were committed, Vinson was arrested by Suffolk police and was subse-
quently questioned by a Portsmouth detective. 4 Vinson argued that the
statements he made to the detective were inadmissable because they were
made subsequent to a warrantless, and therefore improper, arrest. The
court held that the arrest was proper because police had knowledge of the
existence of outstanding misdemeanor warrants. 6 The court went on to
state that even if Vinson's arrest had been illegal, his statement would have
been admissible nonetheless.3 The court founded its decision on the stan-
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Husske, 476 S.E.2d at 925-26 (quoting Mills, 420 S.E.2d at 117); see also Barnabei v.
Commonwealth, 477 S.E.2d 270, 275 (Va. 1996) (holding that a hope or suspicion that
favorable evidence may be procured from an expert is insufficient to require the appointment
of an expert).
33. Vinson, 522 S.E.2d at 176.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 176-77.
37. Id. at 177.
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dard articulated in Thompson v. Commonwealth." In order for a statement
to become subject to the exclusionary rule under Thompson, that statement
must have been made in response to a constitutionally invalid arrest. 9 In
Thompson, the defendant was subject to a warrantless misdemeanor arrest
in violation of a Virginia state statute requiring a warrant for such arrests.?
However, because the warrant requirement for misdemeanor arrests was not
constitutionally mandated, the Fourth Amendment was not implicated
solely by violating the state statute." The court in Thompson went on to
explain that although violations of state statutes are viewed unfavorably, the
Supreme Court of Virginia and the General Assembly have yet to require
that such violations be subject to the exclusionary rule. 2 The Supreme
Court of Virginia has refused to invoke the exclusionary rule where a
defendant has not been deprived of a constitutional right. 4' The court in
Thompson concluded that because the defendant was arrested with probable
cause, in good faith, and without deprivation of any constitutional right,
none of the considerations were present to warrant imposition of the
exclusionary rule." In accordance with the holding in Thompson, because
Vinson's arrest was found to be constitutionally valid, his statement was not
subject to the exclusionary rule.
C. Commonwealth Allowed to Rebut Mitigation Evidence
During-the sentencing phase, the defense presented testimony of two
mental health experts as mitigation evidence.4 ' Both doctors testified that
Vinson suffered from "intermittent explosive disorder" which prevented
him from conforming his conduct to the law at the time of the offenses.'
As rebuttal evidence, the Commonwealth was allowed to present the
testimony of its own mental health expert who agreed with the defense
experts' diagnoses and commented that most violent criminals can be
characterized as suffering from the disorder.47 The Commonwealth's expert
38. 390 S.E.2d 198 (Va. Ct. App. 1990).
39. Thompson v. Commonwealth, 390 S.E.2d 198, 200-01 (Va. Ct. App. 1990).
40. Id.; see VA. CODE ANN. 5 19.2-81 (Michie 1999).
41. Thompson, 390 S.E.2d at 201.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 202.
45. Vimon, 522 S.E.2d at 175.
46. Id. Section 19.2-264.3:1(A) of the Virginia Code provides that upon motion, an
indigent defendant shall be appointed a mental health expert to evaluate the defendant and
present mitigation evidence as to (1) the defendant's mental state at the time of the offense,
(2) the defendant's ability to conform his conduct to law, and (3) any other mitigating factors
relating to the defendant's history and character at the time of the offense. VA. CODE ANN.
S 19.2-264.3:1(A)C(ii)-iii) & (C)Ci)-(iii) (Michie 1995 & 1999 Supp.).
47. Vinson, 522 S.E.2d at 175.
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went on to opine that there was at least a fifty-percent chance that Vinson
would commit another violent crime within the next five years. This
testimony amounted to future dangerousness evidence.48 Vinson argued
that it was error to allow the Commonwealth to present rebuttal testimony
as to Vinson's future dangerousness since the defense experts did not offer
specific testimony as to Vinson's future dangerousness.49 The court dis-
agreed and asserted that the defense's presentation of medical expert testi-
mony as to Vinson's behavior and mental condition was the equivalent of
testimony of Vinson's future dangerousness.i ° The court held that, conse-
quently, it was proper for the trial judge to allow the Commonwealth to
rebut such evidence.51 This holding is extremely disturbing because the
court, completely ignoring the legislative classification set out in section
19.2-264.3:1, simply characterizes the defense evidence as rebuttal of the
Commonwealth's case for future dangerousness. 2 Ignoring legislation is a
problem; employing faulty analysis in order to ignore legislation is a much
more serious problem. The future dangerousness inquiry is necessarily
prospective-it looks toward predicting how the defendant will act in the
ture. Mitigation evidence, on the other hand, is necessarily retrospec-
tive-it looks back at the offense and the defendant until the time of the trial.
When the Commonwealth presents evidence of future dangerousness,
the defendant's mitigation evidence does not factually or analytically rebut
that future dangerousness evidence.53 In Vinson, the Commonwealth
apparently had presented future dangerousness evidence tending to show
that the defendant would in the future be a danger. The defendant's statu-
tory mitigation evidence referred exclusively to the time of his offenses-that
at that time in the past he was unable to conform his conduct to law. That
48. Id.
49. Id. The defense experts testified as to Vinson's behavior and mental state at the
time of the offenses. Id. at 178.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. See VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-264:3.1(A) (Michie 1995 & 1999 Supp.).
53. The statutorily required verdict form makes dear that a jury, after a finding be ond
a reasonable doubt of future dangerousness or vileness, should then consider a defendants
mitigation evidence before imposing death. VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-264.4(D)(1) (Michie 1995
& Supp. 1999). Likewise, the Virginia Model Jury Instructions note the sequence of the
process:
Before the penalty can be fixed at death, the Commonwealth must prove beyond
a reasonable doubt at least one of the .. aggravating circumstances .... If you
find from the evidence that the Commonwealth hasproved beyond a reasonable
doubt both of these circumstances, then you may fix the puiishment at death.But if you nevertheless believe from ail the evidence, including evidence inmitigaton, that the death penalty is not justified, then you shall fx the punish-ment of the defendant at: (1) imprisonment for life; or (2) imprisonment for life
and a fine ....
MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN VIRGINIA: CRIMINAL (1999).
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mitigation evidence, if believed, did not affect whatever decision the jury
might make about future dangerousness. Rather it asked the jury, even if
it found future dangerousness, to consider whether the defendant's mental
condition at the time of the offense was a sufficient ground upon which to
spare his life.
The Vinson holding is also disturbing because it is flatly inconsistent
with Commonwealth v. Cherrix4 and Commonwealth v. Walker."5 In each
of these cases, after the Commonwealth had presented its future dangerous-
ness evidence, the defendant proffered evidence describing prison life and
conditions.' The thrust of this evidence, which is by definition directed to
the future, is that the defendant, once incarcerated in a controlled environ-
ment, would not be dangerous. In both cases the Supreme Court of Virginia
held that the defendant's evidence was not mitigation evidence and, there-
fore, was not admissible."7 The court correctly held that prison-life evidence
is not mitigation evidence. Actually, it is evidence which goes directly
toward predicting whether the defendant will pose a danger in the future-in
other words, anti-future-dangerousness evidence. This evidence directly
rebuts the Commonwealth's future dangerousness evidence. The Common-
wealth bears the burden of persuasion to prove future dangerousness beyond
a reasonable doubt. Thus, a defendant need only raise a reasonable doubt
about his future dangerousness to avoid a death sentence. However, the
holdings in Cberrix and Walker prohibit a defendant from doing so, effec-
tively depriving him of the opportunity to rebut an issue for which the
Commonwealth has the burden of persuasion. Hence, Cberrix and Walker
are incorrectly decided.
After Vinson, Cberrix, and Walker, the Virginia system seems to pro-
ceed as follows: After the Commonwealth has presented its future danger-
ousness evidence, the defendant is allowed to offer mitigation evidence.
However, the defendant is not permitted to present anti-future-dangerous-
ness evidence in rebuttal because that evidence is not mitigation evidence.
If a defendant does offer mitigation evidence, that evidence will be character-
ized as implied anti-future-dangerousness evidence (which Cherrix and
Walker say is inadmissable) and the Commonwealth becomes entitled to
rebut it with additional future dangerousness evidence. This obvious
inconsistency of prohibiting the defendant from rebutting the Common-
wealth's future dangerousness evidence in Cherrix and Walker, but classify-
ing defendant's mitigation evidence as anti-future-dangerousness evidence
54. 513 S.E.2d 642 (Va. 1999).
55. 515 S.E.2d 565 (Va. 1999).
56. See Commonwealth v. Cherrix, 513 S.E.2d 642,653 (Va. 1999); Commonwealth v.
Walker, 515 S.E.2d 565, 574 (Va. 1999).
57. Cherrix, 513 S.E.2d at 653; Walker, 515 S.E.2d at 574.
450 [Vol. 12:2
2000] VINSON V. COMMONWEALTH 451
and allowing the Commonwealth to rebut in Vinson, needS to be challenged
at every opportunity.
Latanya R. White

